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Review and Reply

On “The US Army and the Pacific:
Challenges and Legacies”
Brian McAllister Linn

I

This commentary responds to David M. Finkelstein’s article, “The US Army and
the Pacific: Challenges and Legacies,” published in the Autumn 2020 issue of
Parameters (vol. 50, no. 3).

n his Parameters article, David M. Finkelstein invites countries that
presume to “question US willingness to defend American interests and
those of our allies and partners [to] please review the historical record.” 1
One might expect the head of the Center for Naval Analyses’ China section
to recall Sun Tzu’s stricture to put yourself beyond the possibility of defeat
first before seeking to defeat an enemy. Any historically informed other
country could quickly review that record, which includes, in barely a century,
the Siberian intervention debacle, our passivity toward Japan’s aggression in
China in the 1930s (the USS Panay), the abandonment of the Nationalist
Chinese and South Vietnam, and the over half-century’s imprisonment of the
USS Pueblo. More relevant to Parameters’ readership, and especially Army
officers, is that a review of the historical record does reveal two things
Finkelstein fails to acknowledge. The first is a tradition of the US Navy
drawing the Army into its Pacific strategic agenda. The second is that while
jointness is a laudable objective, there are not only fundamental differences
between sea power and Landpower, but between the US Army’s and Navy’s
core interests.
Finkelstein dismisses the accusation that the United States is an “external
actor” and “latecomer interfering in Asian security affairs.” He asserts the
region’s importance to “our national well-being” dates “to the earliest days
of our country as a maritime trading nation.” Indeed, he alleges the United
States’ “permanent military presence” in the region has been manifest since
1835, with the creation of the East India Squadron. That the establishment
of this squadron coincided with a maritime trade shipping narcotics and
armaments to Asia and exporting its indentured labor goes unsaid. Moreover,
it was neither economic nor national interests that prompted a US Navy
commodore to defy his government’s instructions to remain neutral and instead
assist a British attack against Chinese forces during the Opium Wars. In short,
1. David M. Finkelstein, “The US Army and the Pacific: Challenges and Legacies,” Parameters 50, no. 3
(Autumn 2020): 113–19, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss3/11/.
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contrary to Finkelstein’s altruistic narrative, from the beginning both our
nation and our Navy’s foray into the Pacific provides ample justification
for Asian suspicion of our commercial and security motives today.
One of Finkelstein’s arguments for an expanded Army role in the
Indo-Pacific is its alleged “firm foundation of continuity of presence
and a deep operational legacy.” But the historical record undermines
this assertion. The Army’s permanent presence only began in 1898 after
Commodore George Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron shattered the antiquated
Spanish squadron at Manila Bay. Army leaders, who had naively assumed
the Navy might have warned them of this initiative, were soon ordered to
send an expedition to the Philippines. The Army captured Manila with
relative ease—though the Navy claimed the credit. Far more difficult was
the Army’s long and bloody conquest of the archipelago to secure the
strategic results of Dewey’s cheap one-day, one-off tactical stroke.
This pattern of the Navy looking to the Army to resolve its
problems continued with the emergence of the nation’s first true
joint strategic problem: defending the new Pacific empire. The
Navy insisted on a Philippine base to maintain its battle fleet
in Asian waters but refused to commit that fleet to defend it.
During the Japanese-American war scare of 1907, the Army’s planners
discovered the Navy had stationed its four armored cruisers in Japanese
harbors. Its sole Pacific-based battleship could not depart from the West
Coast for two months and only two ancient monitors and a few torpedo
boats defended the Philippines. At that time the Army had 15,000
soldiers—almost a quarter of its total personnel—in the archipelago.
With few exceptions, insisting the Army stay to fight for an Asian base it
declined to defend remained the Navy’s position for the next three decades.
The consequences played out tragically in 1942 when the Asiatic Fleet
departed the Philippines; those soldiers left behind suffered the greatest
land defeat in the nation’s history.
For Army strategists studying the Pacific’s legacy and challenges,
I offer three strategic truths proposed by the great naval strategist Julian
Corbett over a century ago. First, one of the great benefits of maritime
power is the freedom it offers a nation to limit its military commitments.
Second, naval forces are able to sail away from their commitments and
armies are not. A final and related point is Corbett’s observation that
“command of the sea” may be general or regional, fleeting or permanent. The
United States’ “uncontested military dominance” in the Pacific after
World War II was a temporary condition and a reversal of previous
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policy. The United States (and its Navy) had conceded regional maritime
supremacy in the Far East to the British throughout the nineteenth
century and to Japan implicitly after 1907 and explicitly in 1922 with
the Washington Naval Treaty’s 5-5-3 ratios. The Pueblo Incident might
be taken as indicative of an insignificant naval power’s ability to impose
fleeting local command over its waters. Indeed, only by the most qualified
definition of uncontested can Finkelstein substantiate his claim for
American military dominance in the Pacific since World War II.
The Army serves the nation and it will go where the nation bids.
But its strategists must rigorously study costs, benefits, dangers, and
likely consequences. Appeals to a faux-historical narrative should have no
place in their assessment. A balanced analysis of the Army’s “deep
operational legacy” in the Pacific—the controversial pacification of the
Philippines, the humiliation of Bataan, the bitter interservice battle over
the central or southwestern Pacific, the “Big Bugout” and the Korean
stalemate, and the still embittering Vietnam War—should be as much a
source of caution as an incentive.
Army strategists would do well to question Navy-generated demands
for expansion in the Pacific and examine their historic legacy there. They
could start with one of their own “Old China Hands.” In a 1969 letter to
an Army War College student concerned about Vietnam, General Matthew
Bunker Ridgway outlined the following strategic principles:
. . . identify what are and what are not our vital national interests.
Commit armed forces only in a situation that lies clearly within the zone
of those interests, and where all other means offer little or no hope of being
effective. Recognize that the world has radically altered since the days
of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, or when, as in the case of Great Britain in the
19th century, a small military commitment might be rewarded with large
national gains. Reject any political involvement that might gradually
commit us to military efforts that could jeopardize our basic security or those
vital national interests which cannot be compromised.2

2. Matthew B. Ridgway to Gerald G. Gibbs Jr., letter, October 18, 1969, in Gerald P. Gibbs, “United States
Policy Towards Future Wars of National Liberation (student paper, Army War College), US Army Heritage and
Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
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